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A No-Alternative Approach
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,1 the Supreme Court held that an em-
ployment practice which is nondiscriminatory on its face 2 but which
has a disparate impact3 on blacks is unlawful under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 19644 unless the employer can show that the prac-
tice is a "business necessity."5 The business necessity doctrine thus
adopted in Griggs appears in neither the explicit language nor the
legislative history of the 1964 Act.6
The Court in Griggs did not establish judicial standards for deter-
mining whether a particular practice is a business necessity.7 Subse-
quent to Griggs, the doctrine of business necessity has been extended
far beyond the original narrow holding that practices with a disparate
impact must be "related to job performance." s This is reflected in the
1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. The facially nondiscriminatory hiring practices involved in Griggs were the re-
quirements of a high school diploma and the achievement of satisfactory scores on
two professionally prepared aptitude tests. Id. at 427-28.
3. The term "discriminatory impact," often used in the literature, is avoided since
the word "discriminatory" signifies illegality without further analysis.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-l5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Title VII or as the
1964 Act]. Title VII was amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 [hereinafter cited as the 1972 Act]. In this Note, the
term "pre-Act" refers to the effective date of Title VII, July 2, 1965. See 401 U.S. at 427.
5. 401 U.S. at 431.
6. See Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company: Ruminations on
Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844,
854 n.62 (1972). Griggs involved §§ 703(a), (h) of the 1964 Act, 78 Stat. 255; as amended
in 1972, these sections provide in pertinent part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(h) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an un-
lawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the
results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
7. The Court did not need to explicate such standards, since the employer conceded
having adopted the requirements in question "without meaningful study of their re-
lationship to job-performance ability." 401 U.S. at 425-26, 431.
8. Id. at 431, 432. One commentator has suggested that a court may have departed
from the Griggs standard by permitting an employer to select the best qualified individual
for a job opening when such a selection process helped to perpetuate a pattern of white
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widely held view of the Griggs test as a balancing approach which
focuses on the disparate impact of the practice and weighs this nega-
tive factor against the benefits of the practice to the employer. By
sometimes subordinating legitimate business purposes to the goal of
additional minority hiring, the extension of the business necessity
doctrine has resulted in the imposition of substantial costs on em-
ployers even where their practices may be valid predictors of job
performance. Proper treatment of such costs is critical in achieving
the congressional purpose of Title VII.
Focusing on these costs, this Note will analyze the concept of busi-
ness necessity. Section I will review briefly the theories that have been
suggested under Title VII to justify a practice with a disparate impact.
Section II will demonstrate that Congress did not intend to sacrifice
business efficiency for increases in minority employment and there-
fore envisioned a construction of the Act that would be directed to the
propriety of the employment practice rather than to the adequacy of
the numerical representation of blacks. Section III will show that the
substantial costs associated with the expansive development of the
balancing theory of business necessity can be avoided by the use of an
approach which focuses upon the alternatives available to the employer
to achieve his business goals rather than upon the disparate impact of
the practices. Such an approach, herein called the no-alternative theory,
will be shown to comport more satisfactorily with the congressional
intent underlying Title VII than does the balancing test. Finally, Sec-
tion IV will summarize the benefits from adoption of the no-alterna-
tive theory of business necessity.
I. Theories of Justification for a Disparate Impact
Several possible theories have been suggested under Title VII for
testing a facially neutral employment practice that has a disparate
impact on blacks. The most lenient is the "business purpose" test.
hiring. See Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Con-
cept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REv. 59, 86 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Blumrosen). Another commentator has suggested in criticism that a prominent version
of the business necessity doctrine may well have invalidated any use of employment
screening tests which have a disparate impact on blacks. See Wilson, supra note 6, at
854 n.62 (commenting on the standard in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp. 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)). Another example is a memo-
randum of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), reproduced in
full at 118 CONG. Rec. 4925-27 (1972), which suggests that a company that moves from
an urban community to a suburban community which has a lower percentage of mi-
nority workers may be discriminating in the sense of the Griggs principle unless it
provides to minority workers relief such as assistance in commuting and in obtaining
new housing. For analysis of this idea, see generally Blumrosen, The Duty to Plan
for Fair Employment: Plant Location in White Suburbia, 25 RuTGERs L. REv. 383 (1971).
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Under this theory, a practice can be justified by showing that any
benefit accrues to the business through the use of the practice. This
theory derived from the notion that a subjective intent to discriminate
was necessary for a violation of Title VII;9 the existence of a benefit
indicated a business purpose which operated to negate the element of
intent.10 This approach was effectively repudiated when Griggs rejected
subjective intent to discriminate as a necessary element of a Title VII
violation," but even prior to Griggs, courts had been reluctant to
accept subjective intent as an element of a violation.' - Moreover, even
if such an intent were required, the business purpose theory provided
too easy a means for an employer to mask a discriminatory motive. 13
For these reasons the business purpose theory has been rejected.'
4
Another possible approach is the "no-perpetuation" theory. This
can be viewed as the opposite of the business purpose test, since it
renders unlawful any employment practice which perpetuates the
effects of pre-Act discrimination regardless of the business interests
served by the practice. 15 Taken out of context, one statement of Griggs
can be said to support the no-perpetuation theory.' 6 However, courts
have recognized that although past discrimination has operated to
deprive some blacks of valid job-related qualifications, an employer is
not necessarily barred by Title VII from adopting such requirements. 7
9. See 110 CONG. REC. 7253-57 (1964) (colloquy on "intent" between Sens. Ervin &
Case).
10. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd,
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
11. 401 U.S. at 432.
12. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
13. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
14. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 365-66 (8th Cir. 1973).
15. See Robinson v. Lorillaid Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 841 (M.D.N.C. 1970), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
16. "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operated to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 401 U.S. at 430.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 445 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford
Div., 440 F.2d 1157, 1162-63 (8th Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paper-
workers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
Congressional treatment of seniority plans also suggests that Congress did not intend
the no-perpetuation theory. Seniority plans are often not related to productivity. See
Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1157 8: n.232 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Developments]. Notwithstanding this, however, it was clear that bona fide seniority
systems were permissible under the Act even though they might continue the effects of
past discrimination. Statements explaining Title VII showed that "last hired" blacks
could be the "first fired" even though pre-Act discrimination was the cause of their
status as the "last hired." See 110 CONG. REc. 7207 (Justice Dept. memorandum sub-
mitted by Sen. Clark), 7213 (interpretative memorandum of Sens. Clark & Case), 7217
(Sen. Clark's response to Sen. Dirksen's memorandum) (1964). These expressions of
legislative intent were codified by the subsequent introduction and passage of § 703(h),
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A third approach is the "balancing" test. This theory calls for a
judicial balancing of the impact on an employer of disallowing a prac-
tice and the impact on blacks of allowing the employer to continue
the practice.' s Under this test, "the business purpose must be suf-
ficiently compelling to override any racial impact."'19 The balancing
theory concentrates on the factors to be balanced and their relative
weights, resulting in practice in a requirement of empirical or tech-
nical evidence of the validity, or job-relatedness, of employment
practices.
20
The final possibility is the "no-alternative" theory. This focuses on
two determinations: (1) Does the practice serve a legitimate business
purpose? (2) Is there available an alternative practice which will equally
well promote the business purpose and yet will have a lesser disparate
impact on blacks?21 In order to be lawful, a practice must both further
which expressly exempts from the dictates of the Act "bona fide seniority plans."
42 US.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). This section has been interpreted not to protect seniority
plans based on the period of employment in a specific department, as distinguished
from plans based on the total length of service with the employer. See note 51 infra
(discussion of Jacksonville Terminal). This distinction between employment and de-
partmental seniority plans is discussed and accepted in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,
42 U.S.L.W. 2110 (7th Cir., Aug. 26, 1974).
These congressional statements are rejected in Watkins v. Local 2369, United Steel
Workers, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1227-28 (E.D. La. 1974), where the court felt that the
later addition of § 703(h) to the Act was intended to supersede the earlier statements.
However, Senator Dirksen was a cosponsor of the bill which added § 703(h), see 110
CONG. REc. 11926, 11931 (1964) (Dirksen-Mansfield compromise bill), and it was Senator
Dirksen's serious reservations about the impact of Title VII on seniority systems which
elicited Senator Clark's assurances, discussed above. The conclusion that § 703(h) was
added to codify the earlier statements rather than to supersede them seems inescapable,
particularly in light of Senator Humphrey's explanation that § 703(h) (misprinted
§ 703(b) in Record) did not change the intent and effect of Title VII, id. at 12723,
and his praise for Senator Dirksen's efforts to remove "ambiguities and uncertainties"
in the bill, id. at 12725.
18. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 841 (M.D.N.C. 1970), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971). But see United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 446
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
In the literature, the test has widely been assumed to be a balancing one. See, e.g.,
Affeldt, Title VII in the Federal Courts-Private or Public Law, 15 ViLL. L. REV. 1, 31
(1969) (a "qualitative" balancing); Wilson, supra note 6, at 851; Note, Application
of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation: A Uniform Standard for Both
Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 505, 508, 521, 523 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines]; Note, Fair Employment
Practices: The Concept of Business Necessity, 3 MMPHImS ST. L. REv. 76, 83, 89, 91
(1972); Note, Facially Neutral Criteria and Discrimination under Title VII: Built-in
Headwinds or Permissible Practices?, 6 U. Mics. J.L. Rr. 97, 109 n.71 (1972); 6 GA.
L. REV. 194, 201 (1971).
19. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under
Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The balancing theory has also been called the "com-
pelling business necessity" test. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364
(8th Cir. 1973).
20. See pp. 116-17 infra. The EEOC's Guidelines on Employment Selection Pro-
cedures, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1-.14 (1973), call for such empirical evidence, id. § 1607.4(c).
See pp. 109-10, 112-13 infra.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971);
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
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a valid business purpose and be necessary to achieve that purpose in
the sense that no alternative practice with a lesser disparate impact
would be as effective.
Elements of both the balancing and the no-alternative approaches
are often intermingled in the case law. 22 Although these two ap-
proaches will often lead to the same outcome in specific cases, 23 they
are fundamentally different in orientation and methodology. Because
the issue is one of statutory interpretation, the critical consideration
in selecting between them is which theory better accords with the
legislative intent underlying Title VII.
II. The Purpose of Title VII
A fair employment law such as Title VII can impose economic costs
on an employer in three ways. First, the law may result in a loss of
economic efficiency because it forbids the overt use of race or color
as a job requirement. 24 A second cost to an employer results when
facially nondiscriminatory qualifications that can achieve efficiencies
are held to be unlawful.25 Finally, an "anticipatory" cost occurs if the
employer substitutes less efficient hiring or promotion practices for
his normal procedures in order to achieve results that reduce his risk
of exposure to the enforcement machinery of the fair employment
law.26 Title VII reflects congressional consideration of each of these
three costs.
Overt use of race. Congress clearly intended to impose on employers
22. See cases cited in note 21 supra.
23. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (discussed in note 51 infra).
24. Professor Fiss identifies four situations in which consideration of race may be
efficient for an employer: where, because of societal discrimination, race is an inex-
pensive indicator of talent; where consumers have racial preferences which they can
and will enforce; where personnel conflicts can be reduced by use of racial hiring;
where wage differentials allow exploitation of racial factors. Fiss, A Theory of Fair
Employment Laws, 38 U. CmH. L. REV. 235, 257-58 (1971).
25. The use of such qualifications may be held to be unlawful for two reasons:
(1) A facially neutral job-related practice may be outlawed because its disparate
impact is deemed to outweigh, in some legal sense, the benefits accruing to the
employer from use of the practice. See, e.g., Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444
F.2d 687, 690 (5th Cir. 1971).
(2) The employer may fail to meet the requirements of a stringent burden of
proof on job-relatedness. One case observed that no test known or available today
can meet EEOC Guideline requirements. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 3
BNA FEP CAS. 767, 780 (N.D. Ga. 1971), af 'd in part, vacated in part, 474 F.2d
906 (5th Cir. 1973), criticized in Wilson, supra note 6, at 866. Other courts have
noted that no written or preemployment test has ever passed muster under the
EEOC Guidelines. See Henderson v. First Nat'l Bank, 360 F. Supp. 531, 545 (M.D.
Ala. 1973); Wilson-Sinclair Co. v. Griggs, 211 N.W.2d 133, 141 (Iowa 1973).
26. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 256. Professor Fiss has analogized afiticipatory costs
to "insurance" which the employer is willing to pay to avoid enforcement proceedings.
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any potential loss of efficiency resulting from the inability to use race
as an employment qualification. While § 703(e)27 permits classification
of employees by sex, religion, or national origin where such a classifi-
cation is a "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ), it does not
allow race or color to be used as a BFOQ despite attempts to add these
criteria to the section.
28
Facially neutral qualifications. Congress rejected the notion that an
employer's bona fide use of merit qualifications should be balanced
against, or prohibited as a result of, the disparate impact caused by
those qualifications. "Disparate impact" was not meant to be the touch-
stone of Title VII, for the statute was uniformly interpreted during
congressional consideration to be directed against differences in treat-
ment according to race and not against differences in achievement or
ultimate result.29 Indeed, a great concern in Congress was that the
enactment of Title VII might cause the imposition of quota systems
to alleviate racial imbalance; this concern resulted in the inclusion of
a provision specifically forbidding any interpretation of the Act which
would require an employer to give preferential treatment to an indi-
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
28. Amendments attempting to add race and color as bona fide occupational quali-
fications were offered in the House, 110 CONG. REc. 2550 (1964), and in the Senate, id.
at 13825-26.
29. Professor Fiss has suggested that "equal opportunity" in the context of a fair
employment law can be interpreted in two ways. The equal-treatment interpretation
of fair employment holds that race must be ignored in the selection of employees.
The equal-achievement interpretation holds that employee selection decisions must be
made in such a way that racial inequalities in job distributions are not created or
maintained. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 237.
The legislative history of Title VII indicates that Congress adopted the equal-treatment
approach. Senators Clark and Case, floor managers of Title VII, defined "discrimination"
in an interpretative memorandum:
It has been suggested that the concept of discrimination is vague. In fact it is
clear and simple and has no hidden meanings. To discriminate is to make a dis-
tinction, to make a difference in treatment or favor, and those distinctions or dif-
ferences in treatment or favor, which are prohibited by section 704 are those which
are based on any of the five forbidden criteria: race, color, religion, sex and
national origin. Any other criterion or qualification for employment is not af-
fected by this title.
110 CONC. REc. 7213 (1964). Senator Clark also indicated that the word "discrimination"
was not vague because it had been used in state fair employment statutes for at least
20 years and had been used in federal statutes such as the National Labor Relations
Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act for an even longer period. Id. at 7218 (answers
to objections). The "difference in treatment or favor" definition of discrimination
strongly supports an equal-treatment theory of Title VII. Similarly, the reference to
previous statutory uses of the word "discrimination" also leans heavily toward an
equal-treatment theory of discrimination. See Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 66-75.
This concept of equal treatment continued in the debates concerning amendment of
Title VII in 1972. See 117 CONG. REc. 31974 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell: "we
have an objective of equal treatment under the law"); id. at 31978-79 (remarks of Rep.
Dent, floor manager of bill: "fair treatment legislation"; blacks "do not want special
treatment"); id. at 32089 (remarks of Rep. Dent: a "law to give all men and women
equal treatment"). Congress intended, however, that this equal-treatment theory be
limited to situations in which the requirements for employment were related to ef-
ficiency, see p. 105 & notes 34-36 infra.
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vidual or group because of racial disproportion within the employer's
work force.30 Moreover, the "ability test" provision at issue in Griggs
was specifically included to allow an employer's bona fide use of pro-
fessionally developed tests despite their disparate impact on culturally
disadvantaged minorities.31
Rather than focusing predominantly on the issue of disparate impact,
Congress evidenced a substantial concern for preserving business effi-
ciency and indicated that Title VII was not intended to interfere with
productivity. 32 This protective attitude has continued and was one of
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the antipreferential provision].
31. Id. § 2000e-2(h), quoted in note 6 supra. Senator Tower submitted the amend-
ment adding the ability test language to this section primarily to ensure that Title
VII would not prohibit the use of ability tests when they were standardized on ad-
vantaged groups and thus were affected by cultural deprivation. See 110 CoNG. REC.
11251 (1964) (letter to Sen. Tower). A prohibition on such tests had occurred in Myart
v. Motorola, Inc., Ill. FEPC Charge No. 63C-127, (hearing examiner's opinion reprinted
at 110 CONG. REC. 5662-64, 9030-33 (1964)), and Senator Tower's amendment was directed
to preventing this result under federal law. For the role of this case in Title VII, see
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434 n.10 (1971); Wilson, supra note 6, at 852-58.
One concern of Senator Tower was that employers might be forced to establish grading
differentials on tests to reflect cultural deprivation. See 110 CONe. REC. 9025 (1964)
(statement of Motorola Co.: this has been a pilot case for "a double standard for hiring
with lower criteria for Negroes than for others"); id. at 11251 (letter from a prominent
psychologist urging an amendment to avoid the Motorola holding that any replacement
test must "reflect and equate inequalities and environmental factors among the disad-
vantaged and culturally deprived groups"). Senator Tower's second attempt at amending
the Act to permit the-use of ability tests passed without a roll call, Senator Humphrey
noting that the "Senator has won his point." Id. at 13724.
In implementing Title VII, the EEOC Guidelines require tests to have "differential
validity" where technically feasible. Under this concept "where a test is valid for
two groups but one group characteristically obtains higher test scores than the other
without a corresponding difference in job performance, cutoff scores must be set so
as to predict the same probability of job success in both groups." 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5).
For a discussion of the legal problems associated with differential validity, see Wilson,
supra note 6, at 869-71.
32. In an effort to disparage the results reached in the Motorola case, see note 31
supra, Senator Case introduced a memorandum which was later cited in Griggs, 401
U.S. at 434 n.ll. The memorandum indicates a congressional desire to allow efficient
business practices and clearly rejects an equal-achievement theory for Title VII where
the employer uses qualifications related to productivity:
There is no doubt, however, that such a result [in Motorola] would be unmistakably
improper under the proposed Federal law. The Illinois case is based on the ap-
parent premise that the State law is designed to provide equal opportunity to
Negroes, whether or not as well qualified as White job applicants.
Whatever its merit as a socially desirable objective, title VII would not require,
and no court could read title VII as reqtiring, an employer to lower or change
the occupational qualifications he sets for his employees simply because propor-
tionately fewer Negroes than whites are able to meet them. Thus, it would be
ridiculous, indeed, in addition to being contrary to title VII, for a court to order
an employer who wanted to hire electronics engineers with Ph.D's to lower his
requirements because there were very few Negroes with such degrees or because
prior cultural and educational deprivation of Negroes prevented them from quali-
fying. And, unlike the hearing examiner's interpretation of the Illinois law in the
Motorola case, title VII most certainly would not authorize any requirement that
an employer accept an unqualified applicant or a less qualified applicant and un-
dertake to give him any additional training which might be necessary to enable
him to fill the job.
110 CONG. REc. 7246-47 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of Senator Case].
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the primary reasons the EEOC was not given cease-and-desist powers
in 1972.33
Such solicitude becomes inapposite, however, when the qualifica-
tions used by the employer are unrelated to efficiency. Any disparate
impact on racial minorities that results from such qualifications is
therefore unnecessary and, as held in Griggs,34 unlawful under Title
VII. 3 5 In enacting the 1972 amendments, Congress expressly considered
Griggs and indicated that it viewed the decision as correct not because
of a focus on disparate impact but because of the focus on the absence
of predictiveness of job performance when disparate impact was
shown.36
33. Provisions to grant cease-and-desist power to the EEOC were eliminated from
the final version of the 1972 Act. See 117 CONG. REC. 31979-80 (1971) (amendment of
Rep. Erlenborn in the nature of a substitute, adopted, id. at 32111); 118 id. 3808-09
(amendment of Sen. Dominick, adopted, id. at 3978-79).
The most significant argument raised in opposition to granting ceasc-and-desist power
was that the EEOC was a strong advocate for increased minority representation in em-
ployment and that an adjudicatory hearing before such a tribunal could not be fair.
See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1971) ("Minority Views") [hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP.]; S. REt. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1971) ("Individual Views
of Mr. [Sen.] Dominick") [hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. Such a hearing was frequently
characterized in the debate as a "Star Chamber" proceeding. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc.
595 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tower); id. at 698 (remarks of Sen. Dominick); id. at 3136
(remarks of Sen. Allen). Congress feared that the unfairness of a hearing before such
a predisposed commission would detrimentally affect business efficiency. First, large
costs, attributable to loss of merit standards and to subjection to unwarranted claims,
would be imposed on employers. See, e.g., 117 id. 32108 (remarks of Rep. Rarick). A
specific fear was that an overzealous EEOC would coerce employers to comply with
rules and regulations inconsistent with congressional intent. See, e.g., 118 id. 699 (re-
marks of Sen. Dominick). Special concern was voiced for the small employer. See, e.g.,
id. at 1525-26 (remarks of Sen. Gambrell), 2388 (remarks of Sen. Stennis). Moreover,
proceedings before a biased Commission would result as a practical matter in the shift
of the ultimate burden of proof from the complainant to the employer, contrary to
normal procedure under the Act. See, e.g., 117 id. 31959 (remarks of Rep. Martin),
31967 (remarks of Rep. Anderson in opposition to the argument), 32106 (remarks of
Rep. Broomfield); 118 id. 2393 (remarks of Sen. Cotton). Such a shift was feared to
overburden employers and to result in the law being used as a "bludgeon." See, e.g.,
117 id. 31971-72 (remarks of Rep. Mazzioli).
34. 401 U.S. at 436.
35. Congress seemed to assume that, once explicit reliance on race was proscribed,
employers would use only job-related qualifications. For example, Senator Williams, in
responding to the charge that Title VII would result in employers being forced to hire
blacks in order to establish racial balance, stated:
Those opposed to [Title VII] should realize that to hire a Negro solely because
he is a Negro is racial discrimination, just as much as a "white only" employment -
policy. Both forms of discrimination are prohibited by title VII of this bill. The
language of that title simply states that race is not a qualification for employment.
Every man must be judged according to his ability. In that respect, all men are to
have an equal opportunity to be considered for a particular job.
110 Co. . REc. 8921 (1964) (emphasis added). See also 117 id. 31963 (remarks of Rep.
Hawkins: "[Title VII] only seeks to insure that persons will be treated on their in-
dividual merits and in accordance with their qualifications").
36. See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 8, 21; S. REP., supra note 33, at 14; 117
CONG. REc. 31961 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Perkins). Congress did not perceive Griggs
as holding that "discrimination is conduct which has an adverse effect on minorities
as a class," a characterization of the Griggs holding suggested in Blumrosen, supra note
8, at 84-85.
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Anticipatory costs. Because the skills necessary for performance of a
job may be found more in one cultural group than in another, an
employment practice can have a large disparate impact and nonethe-
less be a measure of job performance. In this case the job, not the
practice, is culturally biased.37 But when enforcement proceedings are
triggered by racial imbalance within the employer's work force and
the standards for proving the validity of practices with a disparate
impact are stringent, the rational employer may "insure" against the
costs of enforcement proceedings by using covert racial hiring prac-
tices to eliminate or reduce the disparate impact.38 Such an anticipatory
action imposes on the employer a cost resulting from the hiring of
blacks who are less suited for the particular position than are available
whites, who cannot be hired because their presence would create or
increase the racial imbalance. This anticipatory cost, however, may be
less than the cost of the enforcement proceeding, discounted by its
probability, which might ensue were a quota system not used. The
legislative history of the antipreferential provision of Title VII 3
shows a purpose to prevent, in addition to legally imposed quotas, the
need for an employer to distort his normal job qualifications as a
practical expedient to avoid enforcement proceedings triggered by
racial disparity.40 This concern over reverse discrimination was reit-
erated in the debates on the 1972 amendments of Title VII and led
in part to the congressional decision to withhold cease-and-desist powers
from the EEOC.
41
37. See Wilson, supra note 6, at 869. 871-72.
38. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 256, 279; Wilson, supra note 6, at 873; Developments,
supra note 17, at 1130.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
40. Senator Aflott introduced the forerunner of the antipreferential provision with:
I have heard over and over again in the last few weeks that title VII, the equal
employment opportunity section, would impose a quota system on employers and
labor unions. . . . [One argument] is that an employer will hire members of
minority groups, regardless of their qualifications, to avoid having any problems
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The resu lt . . . so the
argument goes is that a quota system will be imposed, with employers hiring and
unions accepting members, on the basis of the percentage of population represented
by each specific minority group.
I do not agree with the argument.
But the argument has been made, and I know that employers are also concerned
with the argument. I have therefore prepared an amendment which I believe makes
it clear that no quota system will be imposed if title VII becomes law.
110 CONG. REC. 9881 (1964) (emphasis added). The sense of Senator Allott's amendment
was incorporated into the Dirksen-Mansfield compromise bill as § 703(). See id. at
13310, 13315. For the history of the bill in the Senate, see Vass, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 431, 443-47 (1966).
41. Several members of Congress were concerned that granting cease-and-desist powers
to the EEOC would in practical effect encourage reverse discrimination by employers
in order to prevent harassment by the Commission. See, e.g., 117 CoNG. REC. 31965
(1971) (remarks of Rep. Green); 118 id. 698 (remarks of Sen. Dominick), 1521 (remarks
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III. Application of the No-Alternative Theory
As the above section has demonstrated, Congress did not intend to
promote the goal of increased minority employment at the expense of
business efficiency. Against this background, the no-alternative theory
can now be set forth and examined. The application of this theory
involves four principal inquiries: whether the practice is facially neu-
tral; whether it has a disparate impact on blacks; whether it fosters a
valid business purpose; whether there is available an equally effective
alternative that has a lesser disparate impact on blacks.
Is the employment practice facially neutral? Of the four major deci-
sions, the question of facial neutrality is the least difficult legal issue.
Congress clearly proscribed the explicit use of race as an employment
qualification, 42 and therefore even "business necessity" cannot justify
an employment practice's overt reliance on racial classification.
Does the practice have a disparate impact on blacks? The party
claiming that an employment practice is unlawful has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.43 The complaining
party will generally have met his burden if he can show through the
use of statistics that a facially neutral practice has a disparate impact
on blacks.
44
Disparate impact can be statistically demonstrated in two ways.45
The first considers whether new black applicants as a class are re-
jected by the challenged practice in greater proportion than are new
white applicants. The second focuses on the actual employment results
for the particular business to determine whether the percentage of
blacks hired or promoted is less than the proportion of blacks in the
relevant labor market. Plaintiffs have met the burden of showing dis-
parate impact under both the class impact theory"0 and the propor-
tional employment theory.
47
Does the employment practice foster a valid business purpose? The
third issue under the no-alternative theory is whether the challenged
of Sen. Ervin), 2490-91 (remarks of Sen. Stennis). Specific instances of reverse discrimi-
nation were denounced. See 117 id. 31965-66 (remarks of Rep. Green), 32089 (remarks
of Rep. Dent); 118 id. 731 (remarks of Sen. Saxbe).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970); p. 103 supra.
43. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Local 86, Ironworkers, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245,
247 (10th Cir. 19701, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
45. See generally Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 91-93; Note, Employment Testing: The
Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 900, 909-12 (1972)
(lists three ways, two of which are different approaches to Blumrosen's second method)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Employment Testing].
46. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
47. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (10th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
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practice serves a legitimate business purpose. As recognized by many
of the leading statements of the business necessity doctrine, safety and
efficiency are the essence of a valid business purpose.48 For the private
employer the concept of efficiency encompasses the economic benefits
resulting from an employee's greater competence to perform his tasks,
the administrative costs of predicting such task-related efficiency, and
other costs associated with an individual employee, such as those aris-
ing from processing wage garnishments.Y Recognizing that employee
efficiency is measured on a continuum, the congressional debate ac-
knowledged that the employer could legitimately strive for the maxi-
mum level. 50 Thus any facially neutral practice which increases the
efficiency of a business should be regarded as meeting the "fostering"
test.51
48. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652,
662 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc.,
431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Local 189, United
Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 993 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
49. The relevance of the third aspect of efficiency to the business necessity doctrine
is presently disputed. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Calif.
1971), held that this facet of efficiency cannot be invoked by the employer to justify
a practice with a disparate impact on blacks. This holding has been strongly criticized.
See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 6, at 850-51; 85 HARe. L. REV. 1482 (1972). The Eighth
Circuit has adopted the Pike Corp. rationale. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674
(8th Cir. 1974), rev'g 363 F. Supp. 837, 839 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
Resolution of this dispute is not necessary for the purposes of this Note, which
can be limited to the first two elements of efficiency. The no-alternative approach
would, however, also seem to be an appropriate test for the third element of efficiency.
50. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 7771 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Tower: "The successful
business is one with every job filled by the most competent man available"; "develop
maximum efficiency and maximum per-man productivity"); id. at 7218 (Sen. Clark,
responding to objections, answers: "The employer may set his qualifications as high
as he likes"); Memorandum of Senator Case, supra note 32 (Title VII would not require
an employer to "accept . . . a less qualified applicant"); 117 CONG. Rac. 32108 (1971)
(remarks of Rep. Rarick: "great American ideal that the individual best qualified
gets the job").
51. In this regard the no-alternative test is similar to the discredited business
purpose test. See p. 100 supra. But the two theories are fundamentally different
in that the element of fostering a legitimate business purpose is only one aspect of
the no-alternative approach rather than being the entire test. The "more stringent"
nature of the business necessity doctrine, United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d
354, 365 (8th Cir. 1973), would properly require that the employer demonstrate the
"need," "business purpose," "benefit," or "necessity" of his practice against a back-
ground of realistic alternatives. This distinction is excellently demonstrated by Jones v.
Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971). The employer in Jones refused to grant transfers between two groups of em-
ployees. He sought to justify this no-transfer policy, which in practice had a disparate
impact, for three reasons: bad past experience with transfers; additional training costs;
increased personnel problems caused by different union contracts. Applying the business
purpose test, the district court found the practice lawful; the Tenth Circuit conceded
that the reasons advanced in justification were not insubstantial. Id. at 249. However,
the Court of Appeals found that two of the three reasons given in justification for
the no-transfer policy were speculative or illusory, and that the third reason, appar-
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The practical method of demonstrating an increase in safety or
efficiency is a two-step process of persuading a court, first, that cer-
tain employee traits, attributes, or skills will result in greater safety or
efficiency, and second, that the adopted practice actually is useful in
measuring or predicting those qualities.52 The EEOC Guidelines re-
quire the employer to produce empirical evidence to satisfy this bur-
den of persuasion.53 It is doubtful, however, whether deference to the
ently the one which was "concededly not insubstantial," did not give rise to better
results than would an alternative screening procedure already in use for new hires.
As a result, the no-transfer policy did not pass the business necessity test. Id. at 250.
The most significant challenge to the concept of "fostering" arises in cases where
the employer attempts to choose the "best qualified" candidate for the job rather than
merely choosing randomly among candidates admittedly "qualified." Congress recognized
the lawfulness under Title VII of selecting the most qualified applicant. See note 50
supra. Courts have also acknowledged the legality of such a practice. In United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972),
both the employer's hiring and promotion systems were attacked as racially discrimina-
tory. Each system purported to use the "best qualified" standard. Although many black
applicants were not the "best qualified" because they had been denied opportunities
in pre-Act times to achieve necessary skills, the Fifth Circuit held that the hiring
system was lawful since the qualifications used by the employer were related to the
tasks the applicants were expected to perform. Id. at 445-48.
The promotion system, however, was held unlawful in its alleged use of the "best
qualified" standard. Professor Blumrosen suggests that the "court rejected the company's
desire to promote the 'most qualified' employee because this policy would have per-
petuated the effects of past minority subordination." Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 86.
However, the court actually based its decision on the determination that the company's
definition of "best qualified" in the promotion system was not truly job-related; under
this system, the most senior qualified employee was automatically considered to be
the best qualified, and the particular departmental seniority systems were unrelated to
job performance and perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination. 451 F.2d at 452.
Thus, the holding on the promotion system was squarely in accord with the Quarles
line of cases finding departmental seniority systems to be unlawful where such systems
continue the effects of past discrimination. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). See generally Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Re-
flections on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TExAs L. REv. 1039 (1969). The court's
holding on Jacksonville Terminal's hiring system, where seniority was "scrupulously
avoided" as a factor, 451 F.2d at 446, had already established that the employer could
rely on job-related qualifications even if they perpetuated the effects of pre-Act
discrimination. Accord, Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div., 440 F.2d
1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1971).
52. For standardized tests this process is known as "validation" and is required by
the EEOC Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1973). For concise treatments of the process
of validation, see Wilson, supra note 6, at 858-64; Note, Employment Testing, supra
note 45, at 913-17.
53. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1973) calls for empirical evidence to validate "tests." But
the definition of "test" in § 1607.2 includes not only "paper-and-pencil" tests but also
"performance measures," "specific qualifying or disqualifying personal history or back-
ground requirements" and "specific educational or work history requirements." Moreover,
the Guidelines suggest that the rules applicable to validation of tests are applicable to
all facially neutral practices with a disparate impact on blacks. Id. § 1607.11. Disparate
impact under this latter section can be either of the "class" or "proportional em-
ployment" kind.
This broadened definition of "test" is purportedly designed to serve as part of a
workable set of standards" to give effect to § 703(h) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 20oe-2(h)
(1970), which permits the use of a "professionally developed ability test." See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.1(c) (1973). This definition, however, is difficult to justify under § 703(h), which
the legislative history intends to address traditional paper-and-pencil ability tests such
as the intelligence test in the Motorola case. See Wilson supra note 6, at 852-58; note
31 supra. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Griggs noted that the high school diploma
109
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 84: 98, 1974
technical requirements of the Guidelines is required in all cases
involving practices with a disparate impact,54 and several courts have
refused to adopt inflexible per se rules regarding proof of validity" 5
Some courts have developed the test of reviewing an employment
practice to see whether job-relatedness is shown by "objective" or
"subjective" standards. In such a review, subjective standards are given
little or no weight. 56 The problem in applying this test is the diffi-
culty of identifying objective standards.57 Concepts such as loyalty,
ability, reliability, aptitude, and experience seem inherently subjec-
requirement was not a "test" under § 703(h). 401 U.S. at 433 n.8. The Guidelines
make such a diploma requirement a "test" since it is a "specific educational require-
ment." Similarly, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973),
the Court noted that the employer's refusal to hire one who had participated in an
illegal protest against the corporation did not raise a "test" issue. Under the Guide-
lines, however, the company's standard would be a "specific disqualifying personal his-
tory or background requirement"; the Eighth Circuit had felt that the Griggs principle
was applicable. Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972),
afj'd in part, rev'd in part, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
54. The Court in Griggs stated that the requirement of the Guidelines that tests
be job-related was entitled to judicial deference as an administrative interpretation
of the Act by the enforcing agency, 401 U.S. at 433-34; the Court further held that
the EEOC's interpretation comported with congressional intent. Id. at 434-36. According
to the Fifth Circuit, the deference mandated by Griggs applied to the Guidelines re-
quirement that qualifications be job-related, and not to the EEOC's technical require-
ments on validation procedure. See United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906,
913 (5th Cir. 1973). This holding. would appear correct; in Griggs the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether qualifications had to be job-related at all, and not how
to prove job-relatedness. Others have similarly concluded that the Supreme Court did
not formally adopt the technical aspects of the EEOC's testing Guidelines for Title
VII cases. See Wilson, supra note 6, at 864. But see Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 80, 98
(Guidelines given a "binding effect" in testing situations); Note, Application of the
EEOC Guidelines, supra note 18, at 521. Professor Blumrosen's approach is troublesome,
however, since the term "binding" and the concept of "deference" are incompatible.
See note 65 tnfra.
55. Three such rules have been urged by plaintiffs. The first is that a practice is
per se discriminatory if it has not been validated prior to its use. This is the position
of the EEOC Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1973). It has been rejected under the
theory that only after disparate impact has been shown does the law shift the burden
of proof to the employer and require him to demonstrate job-relatedness. Cooper v.
Alien, 467 F.2d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 1972).
The second per se rule urged by some plaintiffs is that an employment test is un-
lawful if not validated by a person who is a professional in the business of test con-
struction and validation. This has been rejected under the theory that some tests, such
as practical dictation or painting tests, can be obviously job-related even though not
validated by a "professional." Broussard v. Schlumberger Well Servs., 315 F. Supp. 506,
512 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
The third per se rule urged by plaintiffs is that tests can be validated only by
empirical data. This is the position of the EEOC Guidelines. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)
(1973). Such an approach has been rejected. Davis v. Washington, 352 F. Supp. 187,
190-91 (D.D.C. 1972); cf. United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 456
(5th Cir. 1971) (dictum: validation only "most often" by empirical evidence), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
56. See, e.g., Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 463 F.2d 337, 343 (8th Cir. 1972),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
57. One case listed education, experience, ability, length of service, reliability, and
aptitude as the possible objective standards. Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach.
Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1383 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972).
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tive, though facets of such concepts can be demonstrated by objective
indicia.58
The confusion 5 of the use of the terms "objective" and "subjec-
tive" can be avoided by focusing on the question of whether the em-
ployment practice is susceptible to review by the court.0 0 This ap-
proach involves two issues: (1) Is the reasonableness of the practice
which the employer has chosen to achieve his stated goals suspect in
light of current professional studies on employee selection?0 ' (2) Is
58. For example, the seemingly subjective concept of "loyalty" was considered an ap-
propriate concern of the employer where a job applicant had participated in an illegal
protest involving an attempt to close off the employer's access roads during rush hour.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794, 806 n.21 (1973).
59. Compare 463 F.2d at 343, with 411 U.S. at 806 & n.21.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Local 36, Sheet Metal Workers, 416 F.2d 123, 136
(8th Cir. 1969).
61. The EEOC can ensure that it is a party to any Title VII action in which its
expertise is needed to challenge the reasonableness of an employer's practice; under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. II, 1972), the Commission has the first opportunity to bring
suit, and the person aggrieved cannot initiate litigation unless the EEOC has either
dismissed the charge or taken no action for 180 days after the filing of charges. Per-
haps the most significant contribution of the EEOC in exposing outmoded practices
as unreasonable has been its work in attacking standardized tests, such as paper-and-
pencil intelligence tests. These types of tests are often thought to be inherently related
to business needs because a business should be better off with a "more intelligent"
employee. Such notions have proved to be unsophisticated. In many cases there exists
no correlation between test results and job performance. See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority
and Testing under Fair Employment Laws: A General Approach to Objective Cri-
teria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1598, 1643-44 (1969). The literature
on these standardized ability tests is voluminous. For a comprehensive treatment of
the legal problems involved in proving job-relatedness for such tests, see generally
Wilson, supra note 6; Note. Employment Testing, supra note 45; Note, Application
of the EEOC Guidelines, supra note 18.
An excellent example of the application of the first criterion of the "fostering" test
is United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 906 (1972). The court found that in the company's hiring system Terminal
officials had often been able to place into skilled jobs applicants with previous ex-
perience in those same positions. In other cases individuals were hired without previous
experience in a particular job but with previous experience in helper or apprentice-
type jobs in the same craft. For positions such as clerical jobs, educational experience
was used, so that applicants with typing and shorthand experience from business school
were accepted over applicants with only a high school diploma. Id. at 445-46. Without
requiring empirical or other evidence of the validity of the employment standards, the
Fifth Circuit found that these rationales were "legitimate, non-discriminatory business
justifications" for the hiring process. Id. at 448. However, the court found unlawful
the use of a paper-and-pencil test in the promotion system when "validation" of the
test was attempted by correlating estimates of job potential (rather than job per-
formance) with test scores. The court found this evidence particularly unacceptable
when actual results showed that a low scoring employee was functioning satisfactorily
in the higher position. The court felt that Griggs demanded more substantial evidence,
most often empirical proof, in such a situation. Id. at 455-56. See also Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725, 735-36 (1st Cir. 1972) (upholding without empirical evidence a high
school education requirement for the job of policeman because such a requirement
was recommended by two reports of national commissions, but disallowing the use of
a paper-and-pencil employment test which had not been shown to be sufficiently related
to job performance to justify its use), cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973). It is significant that both Jacksonville Terminal and
Castro upheld the use of educational requirements without technical evidence of validity
where the court was able to review the use of the educational standard as reasonable.
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the court able to review the actual implementation of the practice
to determine whether it might have been subverted by discriminatory
application?62 Under this approach, a court should not require an
employer to use the most stringent and burdensome validation proce-
dures of the EEOC Guidelines unless the plaintiff has persuasively
shown that less exacting methods of validation are insufficient in the
particular circumstances of the case. 63 Such selective application of the
EEOC Guidelines by the courts to avoid burdening employers with
unnecessarily strict requirements is consistent with the histories of
the 1964 Act and 1972 Amendments 64 and with the Supreme Court's
See also Wade v. Mississippi Coop. Extension Serv., 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss.
1974). But neither case allowed the use of a paper-and-pencil employment test without
substantial proof of validity. This result may be attributable to the fact that the
reasonableness of such tests is suspect since they have proved to be unreliable in many
instances.
62. The second question of susceptibility to review is in issue, for example, where
a low level official evaluates employees for promotion. In Rowe v. General Motors
Corp., 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972), the court held a promotion system unlawful under
Title VII not because the stated standards of "ability, merit and capacity" were im-
proper subjects for evaluation but because the employer's system of requiring a recom-
mendation by the foreman could not be judicially reviewed to see if "ability, merit
and capacity" were actually the factors considered by the foreman. Id. at 359.
If, contrary to the situation in Rowe, the employer's practice is susceptible to review,
the burden of proof falls on the plaintiff to show that the requirements were under-
mined in practice by discriminatory application. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (suit by individual plaintiff); United States v. Jacksonville
Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 446 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972)
("pattern-or-practice" suits).
63. Under this approach, content validity would usually be sufficient to meet the
employer's burden, and a demonstration of criterion validity, the preferred procedure
of the Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1973), would normally be required only where
content validation was inconclusive. Content validation involves a comparison between
the skills or knowledge sampled by the practice in question and the skills or knowledge
required by the job. The archetypical example of a test with content validity is a
typing test for secretaries. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232
(4th Cir. 1970) (quoting appellant's brief), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980,
988 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Criterion validity, on the other
hand, statistically correlates the results of the test or practical exercise with measures
of actual job performance. The criterion validity approach thus requires empirical data
for the statistical calculations. See generally Wilson, supra note 6, at 858-63. An example
of a case using the approach suggested here is United States v. Jacksonville Terminal
Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (discussed in note
61 supra).
64. The debates reveal that Congress often had in mind a practical and nontech-
nical concept of job-relatedness rather than one which required elaborate or expensive
validation. Representative Celler, the floor leader of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, indicated
that the discharge of an employee based on morals charges or theft was not the type
of employer conduct proscribed by Title VII. 110 CONG. REc. 2567 (1964). In the 1972
debate, Senator Williams, who was the bill sponsor and Senate floor leader, indicated
that the qualifications of the employee included "integrity." 118 id. 2393. Senator Byrd
identified morals, manners, and "appearances as to cleanliness" as relevant considerations
for the employer. Id. at 1412. There is no evidence in the legislative history that these
standards were deemed to be relevant only where some form of empirical or technical
proof showed the concepts to be job-related.
The debate on the ability test exemption, 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe-2(h) (1970), also reflects
a practical view of job-relatedness. In discussing how Title VII differed from the
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understanding of the concept of deference to the Guidelines.6 5
Is there available to the employer an alternative practice that would
equally well achieve his business purpose but with a lesser disparate
impact on blacks? Once the employer has persuaded the court that his
employment practice reasonably accomplishes his valid business goals,
the focus shifts to the question of whether that practice is necessary
to attain these goals in view of available alternatives with a lesser dis-
parate impact.0 6 The issue of who has the burden of proof to show
that an alternative practice is or is not available has not yet been
clearly resolved. 7 The best approach would appear to be one that
Motorola decision, Senator Case introduced a memorandum stating that an electronics
firm could require engineers to have a Ph.D. degree despite the practice's disparate
impact on minorities. See note 32 supra. No indication was given of a need for em-
pirical data showing that possession of a Ph.D. degree actually had an impact on job
performance.
Moreover, Congress considered the federal judiciary to be superior to the EEOC in
resolving civil rights issues. See, e.g., H.R. REP., supra note 33, at 59-63 ("Minority
Views"); 117 CoNG. REc. 32091 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Ford: "I don't want some ad-
ministrative agency making decisions on basic human rights"); id. at 32107 (remarks
of Rep. Shoup: courts are designed to balance all issues); 118 id. 700 (remarks of Sen.
Fannin: civil rights are a matter of human understanding and common sense, qualities
possessed by the judiciary as much as by an agency). One of the express reasons that
adjudicatory hearings under Title VII were left to the federal courts rather than the
EEOC was to protect employers from being subjected to rules and regulations of the
EEOC which did not comport with congressional intent. See note 33 supra. Such sub-
jection can occur not only from application of a Guideline which is inherently invalid
but also from blind adherence to a generally valid Guideline in a situation which
does not fit the particular fact pattern giving rise to the Guideline's validity. See
note 65 infra.
65. Selective application of the EEOC Guidelines occurred in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg.
Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The Guideline involved in that case interpreted the statutory
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of national origin to preclude dis-
crimination on the basis of alienage. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1(d) (1973). The Court, while
recognizing that the Guideline might have significance for a wide range of situations,
refused to recognize it as a valid per se rule and declined to apply it in the instant
case. 414 U.S. at 92. This approach is consistent with the Court's prior interpretations
of judicial deference to administrative agencies in de novo trials. See Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (under the Fair Labor Standards Act, agency's inter-
pretations respected thoueh they are not necessarily binding on the courts in any par-
ticular case).
66. Griggs forbids the use of "artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to em-
ployment." 401 U.S. at 431. Certainly an employment practice with a disparate impact
is unnecessary if the goals of that practice can be accomplished by a practice with a
lesser disparate impact.
67. The EEOC Guidelines leave the burden on the employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3
(1973). This Guideline appears to be impossible to follow and not even the EEOC
applies it literally. See Developments, supra note 17, at 1130-31. Placing the burden on
the party challenging the practice was advocated in Cooper & Sobol, supra note 61, at
1668. Another commentator has suggested that the employer be required to make some
effort to show lack of a better alternative but that the burden on the employer should
not be high because of the difficulty of proving a negative. Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.: The Implications for Private and Public Employers, 50 TExAs L. REv. 901,
914 (1972). In litigation, the plaintiff has frequently been the party to raise the pos-
sibility of an alternative. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d
652, 659 (2d Cir. 1971). But see United States v. Local 24, United Ass'n of Journeymen,
364 F. Supp. 808, 828 (D.N.J. 1973).
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places on the plaintiff the burden of proposing a reasonable alterna-
tive practice while leaving on the employer the ultimate burden of
demonstrating that the suggested alternative is not as efficient or safe
as the challenged practice. 6 The plaintiff's burden of providing a
reasonable alternative should be tailored to the nature of the em-
ployer's proof of job-relatedness, with "reasonableness" being a flex-
ible standard. Where the employer has not used empirical data to
demonstrate an increase in safety or efficiency, the plaintiff should
not have to resort to such evidence to show the reasonableness of the
suggested alternative. If, however, the employer has shown by empirical
data that his practice is job-related, the plaintiff should be required to
make a strong showing of a reasonable alternative, such as by em-
pirical evidence developed in similar situations. 9
A question not yet addressed by the courts is what standard should
be applied where the cost to the employer of the best alternative prac-
tice with a lesser disparate impact exceeds the cost of the challenged
68. Allocating the burden to the plaintiff serves three important purposes. First, it
places the burden on that party most interested in thoroughly exploring the availability
of an alternative, thus ensuring that unnecessary disparate impact will not be un-
wittingly sanctioned merely because the employment practice is in some sense job-
related. For example, one commentator has suggested that in Spurlock v. United Airlines,
Inc., 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972), the court failed to consider reasonable alternatives
to the requirement that employees have a college degree. See Note, Employment Dis-
crimination-Building Up the Headwinds, 52 N.C.L. Rtv. 181 (1973).
Second, placing such a burden on the plaintiff helps reduce the potential for
harassment under the Act by better ensuring that a plaintiff is not pressing his case
on the theory that an employer will not be able to meet impractical standards of
proof of job-relatedness rather than on the theory that an employer's practice is not
actually job-related. Consider, for example, the plight of an employer trying to prove
empirically that a job applicant's participation in an illegal strike against the em-
ployer indicates that the applicant should be rejected. The Supreme Court refused
to place such an onerous burden on the employer:
It is, of course, a predictive evaluation, resistant to empirical proof, whether
"an applicant's past participation in unlawful conduct directed at his prospective
employer might indicate the applicant's lack of a responsible attitude toward
performing work for that employer." . . . But in this case . . . it cannot be said
that petitioner's refusal to employ lacked a rational and neutral business justification.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 n.21 (1973) (emphasis added).
Finally, putting this burden on the plaintiff eliminates the serious problem of nega-
tive proof that would result if the employer had to demonstrate that no alternative
was available. See Developments, supra note 17, at 1130-31.
Moreover, neither the burden on the plaintiff nor that on the defendant-employer
would be unrealistic. The plaintiff will normally be the EEOC, see note 61 supra, an
expert body having knowledge of the development of permissible alternatives such as
those mentioned in Cooper & Sobol, supra note 61, at 1659-60. Moreover, the plaintiff
would not be required to produce detailed data, such as administrative costs, which
would be available as a practical matter only to the employer. Placing the ultimate
burden of proof on the employer is also justified, since only he is in a position to
evaluate and produce evidence concerning the impact of an employment practice on
the safety or efficiency of his operations. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 337 (E. Cleary
ed. 1972).
69. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 61, at 1669.
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practice.70 A "not insubstantial"7' test would seem to be appropriate
here. Such a standard would permit a challenged practice with a dis-
parate impact on blacks if the difference between the cost of the best
alternative and the cost of the challenged practice is not insubstan-
tial.72 While Congress intended that Title VII should not interfere
with business efficiency,73 it is doubtful that such solicitude extended
to a truly insubstantial effect on productivity.
IV. Advantages of the No-Alternative Approach
The primary purpose of a judicially developed business necessity
doctrine should be to accommodate, in a manner consistent with the
legislative intent of Title VII, both the preservation of efficient em-
ployer personnel practices and the elimination of employment policies
that have an unnecessary disparate impact on minorities. The no-
alternative theory is superior in several respects to the balancing ap-
proach in achieving that purpose.
Unnecessary disparate impact. The no-alternative theory permits
70. The term "cost" is intended to reflect a practice's benefits offset by its ad-
ministrative costs. The courts have indicated that they will not consider certain costs
of a suggested alternative when comparing its efficiency with that of a challenged
practice. Such costs include the loss associated with pressure, such as a strike, threatened
by a union where an employer attempted to adjast a departmental seniority system
perpetuating overt pre-Act discrimination. The rationale of the courts in rejecting such
costs is that black employees' rights under Title VII should not be subject to being
bargained away by unions and employers. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444
F.2d 791, 799-800 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
A second such cost is the loss of morale suffered by white employees due to re-
alignment of their seniority rights in order to eliminate the disparate impact of a
departmental seniority system of a no-transfer policy which perpetuates overt pre-Act
discrimination. This cost has been rejected under the rationale that black employees'
rights should not be afforded less weight than white employees' expectations derived
from a departmental seniority system rooted in a history of overt discrimination. See,
e.g.. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
The appropriateness of disregarding certain costs stemming from the employer's in-
tentional choice of overt discrimination in pre-Act times has been recognized in a
leading economic analysis of Title VII. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 303-04. But where
the employer has not discriminated in the past, disregarding white employees' expec-
tations from a seniority system would appear to be a form of preferential treatment
for blacks. See Goodloe v. Martin Marietta Corp., 5 BNA FEP CAs. 1046, 1048-49 (D.
Colo. 1972).
71. This phrase is taken from Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245,
249 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971).
72. The phrase "not insubstantial" refers to a difference in costs which is not
trivial or de minimis. This standard is a relative one and includes consideration of
the economic situation of the specific employer. For example, a cost differential may
be truly insubstantial for a large business with many employees but not for a smaller
employer with fewer workers. A standard which takes into account the size of an
employer's operation is consistent with the concern expressed in Congress for small
business. See 118 CONG. Rac. 1525-26 (remarks of Sen. Gambrell), 2388 (remarks of Sen.
Stennis) (1972). Moreover, it should again be noted that the standard suggested here
is not a reversion to the discredited business purpose test. See note 51 supra.
73. See note 32 supra.
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facially neutral practices that are essential for increasing the safety or
efficiency of a business. These increases, unless truly insubstantial, are
not subject to being "balanced" away because of a concomitant dis-
parate impact, and this approach thus comports with the intent of Con-
gress to allow the use of job-related qualifications notwithstanding an
adverse ultimate impact on minorities.74 But the no-alternative theory
does not permit the use of a practice with a disparate impact if another
practice can achieve equal benefits with a lesser disparate impact. By
focusing attention on the importance of examining alternatives, this
approach helps prevent judicial approbation of job-related practices
that adversely affect minorities but are not more efficient than avail-
able alternatives.
75
Reducing reverse discrimination. Since reverse discrimination, in-
cluding use of a private quota system, is both economically inefficient
because of anticipatory costs70 and unlawful under Title VII,77 the
business necessity doctrine should be designed to reduce the pressures
for discrimination resulting from an employer's desire to avoid en-
forcement proceedings. 78 In this regard, the no-alternative approach
is superior to the balancing test in two ways.
The first issue is that of expense. Because of the need to determine
if a practice's benefit to the employer is outweighed by its disparate
impact, the balancing approach requires that the benefit be quanti-
fied.79 The preferred method of the EEOC Guidelines for quantifying
the benefit is through the use of a measure of the criterion validity of
the practice, i.e., a statistical measure of how well results of the prac-
tice correlate with actual job performance.80 Thus, the balancing ap-
74. See p. 106 supra.
75. See note 68 supra.
76. See p. 106 supra.
77. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); 110 CONG. REc. 8921
(1964) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. at 7210, 7213 (Interpretative Memorandum of
Sens. Clark & Case: "[A]ny deliberate attempt to maintain a racial balance . . .
would involve a violation of Title VII"); id. at 7218 (remarks of Sen. Clark: "Quotas
are themselves discriminatory").
78. See p. 106 supra.
79. See p. 101 supra.
80. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1973). In addition to expense, there are two major
difficulties with using the degree of criterion validity as the sole measure of a prac-
tice's benefit to an employer. The first is that the profitability of a practice is not
linearly related to its degree of validity. A practice with a very low, but positive,
degree of validity can result in a substantial increase in profitability. See Note, Ap-
plication of the EEOC Guidelines, supra note 18, at 520 n.89.
The second problem is that using degree of criterion validity to measure employer
benefit ignores the administrative costs of a practice. Though one practice may predict
job performance better than another, the administrative costs of the first may exceed
the administrative costs of the second by an amount greater than the profitability of
the increase in performance from use of the first. In such a case, the rational employer
would choose the practice with the lower rather than the higher degree of validity.
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proach tends to reject less technical evidence of the validity of a prac-
tice.8' This approach thus compels the employer to incur substantial
expense in order to adduce the requisite technical evidence, thereby
ensuring that Title VII will become a "full employment act for indus-
trial psychologists."8 2 The resultant expense realistically leaves the
employer little alternative to adopting a private quota system to avoid
the costs of an enforcement proceeding, particularly if the skills needed
by his employees are found in proportionally fewer minority appli-
cants than in whites. The no-alternative approach would require tech-
nical evidence of job-relatedness in those cases where the practice was
suspected to be invalid,8 3 but in cases where a reasonable inference of
job-relatedness was established, the approach would focus primarily
on the alternatives available to achieve the employer's goals. In such
a review, the relative costs and benefits of practices could often be
evaluated without expensive or technical procedures.
84
The no-alternative approach is also superior to the balancing test
in reducing reverse discrimination in that it enables the employer to
evaluate his personnel practices against a clear legal standard. Under
the balancing approach the requisite weighing is between the incom-
mensurable entities of employer benefit and disparate impact. Even
if both the benefit and the disparate impact of a practice can be ac-
curately quantified, such a weighing cannot be performed with any
certainty by anyone other than the trier who decides the specific
case. 85 On the other hand, the no-alternative approach would allow
the employer to assess his own practices since he can reasonably deter-
mine the facts necessary to make the comparisons among the levels
of benefits for a range of practices and among the disparate impacts
of practices that have equal benefits. This self-evaluation aspect of the
Indeed, almost all employment screening practices are an attempt to avoid the ad-
ministrative expense of the highly valid but costly technique of hiring every applicant
for a job and then firing all of them except the person with the highest actual
performance.
81. The issue presented by Griggs and the EEOC Guidelines is whether the de-
gree of validity of the test is sufficient to overcome its discriminatory impact . ..
Although expert testimony . . . may establish a reasonable inference of job-re-
latedness, it does not provide the trier of fact with an adequate basis for comparing
the benefit of an employment test to the employer with its discriminatory impact
on minority applicants.
Note, Application of the EEOC Guidelines, supra note 18, at 523.
82. Blumrosen, supra note 8, at 104, cited in Wilson-Sinclair Co. v. Griggs, 211 N.W.2d
133, 141 (Iowa 1973).
83. See p. 112 supra.
84. See, e.g., Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971) (discussed in note 51 supra).
85. The outcome of such a weighing may reflect the predilection of the trier toward
an equal-achievement or equal-treatment theory more than a search for neutral prin-
ciples. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 240.
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no-alternative approach comports with the congressional desire for
clarity and predictability in this area so that employers can comply
with the law in a manner consonant with sound business planning.8,
According substantial weight to state decisions. Because of congres-
sional concern for the concept of federalism, the EEOC is required
under Title VII to defer action to state fair employment authorities 7
and to accord "substantial weight" to final findings and orders made
by such authorities.88 The EEOC has interpreted the latter mandate
to exclude conclusions of law, thereby affording the specified weight
only to determinations of fact.89 Since the balancing approach makes
each business necessity case turn on an ad hoc conclusion of law con-
cerning the relative value of each of the competing interests, "substan-
tial weight" would not in any meaningful sense be given to the final
orders of a state fair employment authority even if the EEOC agreed
with both the state's findings of fact and statutory construction of fed-
eral law.90 Such an approach is inconsistent with the congressional
view of Title VII as a "states' rights bill" under which the states and
localities would be afforded every opportunity to resolve the problems
of racial justice through their own agencies. 91 This legislative policy
would be better served by the no-alternative approach, under which
findings of fact on differences in benefits and levels of disparate im-
pact lead predictably to the ultimate legal conclusion.
9 2
Conclusion
Both the ultimate enforcement and interpretation of Title VII have
been left to the federal judiciary. In choosing this scheme, Congress
perceived the courts as the defender of minority groups against "arti-
86. 118 CONG. REC. 595 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Tower).
87. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), (d) (Supp. II, 1972).
88. Id. § 2000e-5(b).
89. EEOC Procedural Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19b(e)(2) (1973).
90. Two related but nonetheless distinct legal issues are involved in a business
necessity case. The first, a matter of statutory construction, concerns the proper standard
to be applied under Title VII. Once this is established, the application of the standard to
the facts in a particular case leads to a conclusion of law. Whether the balancing test
is the correct rule under Title VII is a question of statutory interpretation; in con-
trast, the relative weights assigned in an individual case and the ultimate balance
struck are conclusions of law.
91. 110 CONG. REC. 12724-25 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey explaining the com-
promise package bill).
92. If the balancing approach reflects the intent of Congress, a meaningful deference
to state authorities could logically be established by amending the EEOC regulations
to mandate "substantial weight" for state conclusions of law on the valuation of the
relative weights applied in a particular case. Congress, however, considered the rights
protected by Title VII as federal in nature. Id. Thus, the EEOC's present policy of
not according "substantial weight" to any conclusions of law by state authorities seems
correct.
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ficial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment."93 In so do-
ing, however, it intended neither to subject employers to costly and
unreasonable burdens nor to disadvantage white employees by prefer-
ential treatment for minority groups. 94 Proper accommodation of these
interests will not occur if the disparate impact on minority groups
that results from a facially neutral employment practice is viewed as a
negative factor to be balanced against the increase in profitability en-
suing from the use of the practice. Rather, the courts can effectuate
the congressional intent only if they treat such a disparate impact as
a'n appropriate triggering mechanism for testing the practice against
the best alternatives available to achieve the employer's stated goals.
93. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
94. The federal courts cannot rely on the EEOC to assist in effectuating this con-
gressional intent. Congress recognized the EEOC as an advocate for greater minority
utilization in employment. See note 33 supra. Thus one EEOC staff member has stated,
"The anti-preferential hiring provisions are a big zero, a nothing, a nullity. They don't
mean anything at all to us." Developments, supra note 17, at 1165 n.279. Professor
Fiss has suggested that to the extent equal achievement rather than equal treatment
is seen as the goal of the law, the greater will be the pressures to construe the law
in such a way as to allow preferential treatment of blacks. See Fiss, supra note 24, at 240.
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